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Executive summary
Public and private actors and their networks are committing substantial resources to support agro-dealers to 
deliver novel technologies and information in line with the New Green Revolution for Africa. The main point of 
entry has been the cereal seed system, with a focus on maize seed in particular, which is seen as both a key staple 
and a politically important crop. In Kenya, the seed system landscape has been changing dramatically in recent 
years, with the entry of highly influential seed companies, biotechnology research and legislation of the biosafety 
regulations. Thus, the prospect of genetically modified (GM) crops being pushed through agribusiness networks 
is an emerging issue, raising the question of whether small-scale, independent stockists or ‘agro-dealers’ have the 
capacity to deliver these technologies and provide local regulatory control over the new seeds. 
This study sought to investigate the policy and institutional environment within which agricultural biotechnology 
agro-dealers have evolved, as well as the agendas that are being pushed by particular interests in the new pro-GM 
policy and institutional environment in Kenya and their expected outcomes. In response to this evolving situation, 
an agro-dealer survey was conducted in high- and low-rainfall areas, in addition to an examination of two maize 
projects: STRIGAWAY® Technology and Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA). STRIGAWAY® Technology is expected 
to provide a test case for delivering WEMA to smallholder farmers, with agro-dealership at the core of the 
initiative.
Research conducted by this study has found that the current commercial model of agro-dealership is faced with 
several challenges, raising issues concerning its sustainability in delivering novel technologies. 
Agro-dealers lack adequate knowledge of the current commercial cereal seed varieties, and are also ill-equipped 
to address farmers’ concerns on the utilization of existing technologies. The feedback mechanisms to address 
farmers’ concerns are weak, and promises made to address these weaknesses remain unfulfilled.
Agro-dealers operate on a small capital base which limits their ability to procure meaningful stocks for new 
technological products. New technological products are rife with demand risks for agro-dealers. Many dealers seek 
assurance that their investments in new technologies can stimulate sufficient farmer demand to secure positive 
returns. Agro-dealers have called for demand stimulation through guaranteed markets for agricultural outputs and 
the stabilisation of output prices.  It is seen that this would then lead to increased demand for the new 
technologies. 
Regulatory enforcement has been a major constraint in the seed trade, leaving trading loopholes that have 
allowed ‘fake’ and poor quality seeds and unlicensed agro-dealers to infiltrate the system. Unless synergies are 
developed among agencies in charge of regulating agro-dealership, illegal agro-dealers and the proliferation of 
poor quality, adulterated and counterfeit inputs will continue to flourish, ruining the efforts of a New Green Revolution 
in Kenya delivered by agro-dealers. 
Farmers and agro-dealers welcome the potential benefits of GM crops and seed, but they are wary of the perceived 
concurrent risks. A specific risk that has been identified is the erosion of genetic diversity in the smallholder farming, 
a result of gene flow, which is believed will lead to the disappearance of traditional varieties and the reliance of 
farmers on expensive external inputs. 
The Kenyan agro-dealership in its present state is not capable of efficiently delivering GM seeds to farmers and 
providing a front-line regulatory service for their use. Extending trade in this new agricultural technology will require 
a much higher level of technical skills in agro-dealers than conventional technologies have demanded previously. 
Dealers will also be responding to new regulatory, economic and social challenges. Engaging Kenyan agro-dealers 
in GM technology delivery must take these governance issues into consideration if it is to be carried out 
successfully.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Agricultural biotechnology is considered an important 
tool in addressing the problems of agricultural 
productivity and food security,i and is broadly categorized 
into traditional and modern biotechnology. Traditional 
biotechnology invo lves the use of traditional techniques 
such as fermentation, application, tissue culture, and in 
vitro techniques; whereas modern biotechnology uses 
genetic engineering techniques. 
The transition from green revolution to gene revolution 
has been marked by changes in research and development 
work, along with the actors involved in these. For example, 
while the successful development and deployment of 
the Green Revolution varieties were largely carried out 
by public institutions, the gene revolution, with its focus 
on GM plants, uses a different approach.ii A majority of 
these research products are developed and deployed 
by the private sector or through public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) for commercial purposes (Bramel 
and Remington 2005). The private sector employs the 
agro-dealer model for the delivery of traditional (bio)
technology products, especially seeds. Policy challenges 
arise, however, with respect to how modern 
biotechnologies would be dispersed, especially to poor 
smallholder farmers, in order to realize the envisaged 
productivity growth.
This study investigates the political and economic 
issues concerning the use of agro-dealers in delivering 
GM seeds in Kenya,iii among which include GM cereal 
seeds. These particular varieties are bred for resistance 
to harsh environmental conditions, such as drought and 
insect pests, along with enhanced nutritional quality. 
Public and private sector actors, together with their 
networks, are committing substantial efforts and 
resources to build and organize agro-dealer-based seed 
delivery systems.
The unique nature of some biotechnology applications 
and processes has led to the development of new 
regulatory regimes that focus either on the product or 
a combination of the process and the product (Konde 
2006). The key regulations fall broadly into intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) and biosafety regulations. As 
cautioned in the report by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), despite its potential, biotechnology 
is not a remedy to all agricultural productivity and food 
security issues (FAO 2004). The FAO report makes clear 
that biotechnology cannot overcome the gaps in 
infrastructure, markets, breeding capacity, input delivery 
systems and extension services that hinder all efforts to 
promote agricultural growth especially in poor, remote 
areas.
For the purposes of this study, an agro-dealer model 
was used as an entry point in assessing both the front-end 
concerns of agricultural biotechnology, such as 
investment, partnerships and IPR issues, and their 
back-end issues, including biosafety regulation in 
technology deployment and downstream impact of 
GMOs in Kenya’s smallholder agriculture. In particular, 
the study sought to establish whether agro-dealers in 
Kenya have the capacity to deliver GM technologies and 
information services by analyzing the policy and 
regulatory environment and the attributes of agro-
dealers and their perceptions of the potential benefits 
and risks of GM technologies. The study has also 
endeavoured to draw lessons from two case studies --to 
analyse biotechnology policy processes. The first case 
study is STRIGAWAY® Technology, which is non-transgenic 
but already commercialized, while the second case is 
WEMA project, which is transgenic and at the level of 
confined field trials.
1.2  Conceptual Framework
The Knowledge, Technology and Society (KNOTS) 
policy processes’ conceptual framework was employed 
by this study due to its focus on three different but 
overlapping lenses, namely: actors and institutions and 
their roles; policy narratives and discourses; and politics 
and interests (IDS 2006). The first lens, actors and 
institutions, centres on the organisations and networks 
that are involved both formally and informally in 
biotechnology and seed systems policy processes. It 
assesses how organisations and networks interact and 
subsequently shape the processes of making 
biotechnology and seed system policies. 
The narratives and discourses lens looks at how 
research and policy problem-solution storylines are 
constructed, perpetuated, communicated and associated 
with the policy process. These storylines provide 
justification for research and technology solutions that 
are given for particular agricultural production problems. 
On the other hand, the politics and interests lens focuses 
on the power dynamics that various actors and institutions 
wield in their relationship with policy. This lens also 
examines the causes behind policy agenda pursuit and 
acceptance by some actors and the rejection of others. 
Understanding policy processes through an 
examination of knowledge/narratives, actors/networks 
and politics/interests can help with identifying policy 
spaces. For example, the emergence of alternative 
narratives (storylines) is possible where there is a 
weakness in the articulation of the dominant narrative. 
This in turn requires the identification of policy spaces 
within networks (spaces to join the network, or key actors 
who can be enrolled into an alternative network) (Keeley 
and Scoones 2003). A deeper examination of strategies 
for changing and influencing policy can be achieved by 
looking at these policy spaces.
This analytical framework aims to investigate the 
trends and drivers of policy processes surrounding 
biotechnology and GM seed delivery systems. This 
approach is guided by key analytical elements which 
include: investment and partnerships in biotechnology 
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product development; intellectual property rights; 
regulatory issues, including biosafety; business models 
for biotechnology product delivery; and downstream 
impact of agricultural biotechnology research and 
development (R&D). 
1.3  Study approach and methodology
This study attempts to answer the question: Do agro-
dealers have the capacity to deliver GM technologies? 
GM crops/seeds are not yet commercially available in 
Kenya, therefore this study is anticipatory (ex ante). 
However, the STRIGAWAY® Technology project test case 
has been highlighted, which is widely believed to be a 
model through which GM seeds and other drought-
tolerant hybrid seeds will be deployed (c.f. Odame and 
Muange 2011). The case studies involved confined field 
trials of a GM maize variety under WEMA and the 
promotion of Imazapyr-resistant maize (IR-Maize) 
technology. An extensive literature review was conducted 
of relevant published reports and websites of key 
organizations. The African Agricultural Technology 
Foundation (AATF) was considered a crucial organizational 
contact due to its leadership in Biotechnology 
brokerage.  
To strengthen the literature review, interviews were 
conducted with key representatives across the seed 
supply chain, which included two seed companies, one 
NGO involved in deployment of IR-Maize, the Chairman 
of an agro-dealer network and two farmer representatives 
(Appendix 1). Two focus group discussions involving 
farmer groups were also held in Western Kenya, where 
IR-Maize technology has been deployed and a clear test 
case could be conducted. The purpose of key informant 
and focus group discussions was to identify general 
issues, assess the perceived benefits and risks associated 
with GM crops/seeds, and generate recommendations 
on preferred models of GM technology delivery. 
Additionally, an agro-dealer survey involving 140 agro-
dealers was conducted in two counties: Machakos is 
located in a low rainfall region and Uasin Gishu is located 
in a high rainfall region, representing the country’s main 
cereal-growing zone. The survey assessed the awareness 
and perceptions of agro-dealers concerning genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), and their capacity to 
disseminate seeds of GM cereal crops. Further insights 
into these issues were exchanged through discussions 
held by policymakers and researchers from Kenya and 
the Philippines during the Biosafety Workshop in Nairobi 
in November 2010 (Odame and Okumu 2010).
1.4  Organization of the paper
The paper is organized into five chapters. Chapter One 
is the introduction, which covers the purpose of the study, 
the conceptual framework and the methodology. Chapter 
Two reviews biotechnology policy processes in Kenya. 
The results of a  survey of agro-dealer GMO awareness, 
perceptions of potential benefits and risks of GM 
technologies and trading capacity is presented in Chapter 
Three. Chapter Four presents the two case studies of 
biotechnology delivery mechanisms: the cases of 
IR-maize technology and WEMA technology. Chapter 
Five provides a synthesis and conclusion of the study 
findings.
2.0  Biotechnology Policy 
Context
2.1  Overview
The role of modern biotechnology in the economic 
transformation and sustainable development of African 
agriculture is the subject of increasing debate and 
controversy. The subject has been at the forefront of 
international agricultural policy discussions and in the 
politics of international trade (Glover 2003). The polarity 
of US and European opinion on the societal impacts of 
biotechnology, specifically genetic modification, has 
equally shaped the biotechnology and biosafety debates 
in developing countries. The Kenyan biotechnology 
policy debate can be traced to the 1990s, however, in 
more recent years, it has acquired new dimensions as a 
result of a variety of factors including rapid scientific and 
technological advances in biotechnology, increasing 
commercialization of genetically modified foods, 
increasing food insecurity in Africa, and growth in the 
activities and influence of environmental activists. 
Despite ongoing debates and divergent opinions, the 
most important concern to both proponents and critics 
of biotechnology is the regulation (to minimize) the 
potential risks of GM technologies to the environment 
or health. With a focus on the downstream risks and 
effects of GMOs, biosafety regulation is just one piece in 
the multi-faceted issue of innovation governance. 
This review of global-local biotechnology policy 
processes, from a historic perspective, is concerned with 
front-end issues such as investments, partnerships and 
IPRs in research as well as back-end issues including 
biosafety regulations in GM technology deployment. In 
so doing, the review employs the KNOTS framework of 
policy processes. As highlighted in the introduction 
section of this report, the framework comprises of three 
overlapping lenses: actors and institutions, their 
narratives, and their politics and interests. In this review, 
we contend that the interaction of these lenses create 
‘spaces’ for influencing agricultural biotechnology policy 
agenda in Kenya.
2.2  Investments and partnerships in 
biotechnology
Global trends in modern biotechnology have seen 
increased investment in research and public policy 
development. The global context of agricultural 
biotechnology R&D policy is mainly influenced by 
interests of the private sector in both industrialized and 
developing countries. Whilst industrialized countries are 
ahead in biotechnology developments, developing 
countries are generally following, the existing gap is 
partly due to weak policy and regulatory frameworks to 
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govern technology development and deployment, and 
limited national investment in biotechnology research. 
Public-private partnerships have also been significant 
in the development and deployment of modern 
agricultural biotechnology products in developing 
countries (James 2007), with multi-national corporations 
dominating funding for investment in biotechnology 
R&D.  For instance, in the US venture financing reached 
an all-time high in 2007, with investment totaling about 
US $7.5 billion, fuelled by a record total of US $5.5 billion. 
Overall, the US is the global leader in biotechnology 
investment, R&D and the commercialization of 
biotechnology products (Ernst and Young 2007).
In contrast, through the National Agricultural Research 
Systems (NARS), governments in developing countries 
invest 5-10 percent of their total research expenditures 
on biotechnology.  Donor funds accounted for a 
considerable share of the investment, amounting to 
roughly 60 percent in the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe 
(Jansen et al. 2000) . 
Apart from private industry funds and NARS, financial 
support towards biotechnology also comes from 
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs). In 
particular, the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) invests an estimated US 
$25 million annually in biotechnology development. This 
figure represents 7.7 percent of the total CGIAR budget 
(Morris and Hoisington 2000).
At the global level, increased investment for 
biotechnology has been accompanied by a rapid 
expansion in the farmland areas covered by GM crops. 
Since the commercialisation of the first GM crop in 1996, 
the global area has increased from 4.2 million acres in 
1996 to 282 million acres in 2007 - a 67-fold increase 
(James 2007). As of 2008, roughly 25 countries had started 
planting GM crops, cotton being the most common of 
these, and the land area being used to cultivate GM crops 
was estimated at 2 billion acres (or 800 million hectares). 
The number of global farmers cultivating GM crops had 
risen to 10.3 million by 2006. It was reported that 
approximately 12 million resource-poor farmers in 
developing countries (including South Africa, China and 
India) grew biotech crops in 2007, a significant increase 
since 2002 when the figure was closer to 5 million.  In 
2008 three new countries (including Egypt and Burkina 
Faso) and 1.3 million new farmers adopted biotech 
crops. 
Trends in biotechnology investments and partnerships 
demonstrate that GM crops and traits (e.g. insect 
resistance, herbicide tolerance) that have been developed 
to date have been targeted at the needs of large-scale 
commercial farmers, particularly in North America. 
Agriculturalists such as the smallholder African 
subsistence farmers, on the other hand, have been largely 
excluded from consideration. The less well known crops 
grown by smallholder farmers in developing countries 
are not regarded as viable crops for biotech development. 
Similarly, crop traits of priority to subsistence farmers, 
such as declining soil fertility, drought, declining ground 
water levels and salinity, have only recently been 
considered by biotech developers. Many of the crop-
growing challenges facing subsistence farmers in 
marginal areas require a variety of genes traits, whereas 
current GM crops provide only singular gene traits, such 
as Bacillus thrungiensis (Bt) or herbicide tolerance.
The limited response to the needs of small-scale 
subsistence farming by transgenics has led its critics to 
raise the need to look for alternatives, including such 
practices as ecological or organic agriculture, integrated 
pest and fertility management, participatory plant 
breeding, tissue culture, and marker-assisted breeding. 
These non-transgenic biotechnologies are considered 
cost-effective and do not involve the controversies 
related to GM development, such as IPRs and biosafety 
concerns.
Investment in agricultural biotechnology in Kenya is 
still limited to public-funded traditional technologies 
such as bio-fertilizers and tissue culture. However, there 
are declining trends in the public-sector funding of 
traditional (bio)technologies. In contrast, private funding 
is improving, though still confined to a few PPP research 
initiatives, focusing on the development of agricultural 
transgenic biotechnology such as a GM sweet potato, 
Bt. maize, Bt. cotton, and non-GM herbicide resistance 
in maize to combat the Striga weed. These research 
programmes are largely funded and supported by donor 
organizations, philanthropists and multinational 
companies, such as USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Howard 
G. Buffet Foundation, and Monsanto. Although many of 
these technologies are yet to be commercialised for 
adoption by farmers in Kenya, the partners behind them 
have stimulated activities in Kenya’s science and 
technology (S&T) policy and influenced the development 
of legal and regulatory frameworks. 
2.3  Intellectual property rights and  
 access to biotechnology 
Access to agricultural biotechnology products and 
processes by developing countries is becoming more 
difficult as biotech companies consolidate, merge and 
form strategic alliances. To access such goods, developing 
countries are required to form partnerships and make 
collaborative arrangements that can sometimes be to 
their disadvantage. Additionally, the inevitable 
commoditisation and privatisation of biotechnology 
often leads to products that are too highly priced for 
poor countries’ access. In other cases, gaining access to 
transgenic biotech products that could address some of 
the cropping problems facing resource-poor farmers is 
severely limited by the extended ownership and complex 
arrangements of multinational companies.  The related 
IPR implications include the imposition by multinational 
companies of limitless biological patents on particular 
GM crops, with serious repercussions for food safety, 
biological diversity, driving farmers towards dependency 
on costly seed, chemical purchases and foreign companies 
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that produce them, and the compromise of both farmers’ 
democratic choice and their food security (Berstein et 
al. 1990). 
Whilst appreciating that the partnerships discussed 
in the preceding paragraph are fundamental for the 
growth and development of biotechnology, scientists 
and policy-makers in developing countries lack the 
necessary knowledge and skills for negotiating and 
collaborating with the private industry. Some efforts are 
being pursued under partnerships to increase the 
affordability of these technologies by negotiating for 
royalty-free technologies. However, closer analysis of 
these arrangements reveals that despite committing to 
providing royalty-free technologies, biotech companies 
are exploring Genetic Use Restriction Technology (GURT) 
to further their interests. GURT would ensure that farmers 
using this variety of seed would then be forced to 
purchase and apply additional chemicals that are needed 
in order for the new seeds to function (Millstone and 
Lang 2008). Whilst the GURT strategy will increase 
company sale revenues on one hand, it will simultaneously 
escalate the price of the seed/technology and further 
reduce the scope of affordability for resource-poor and 
smallholder farmers. 
Issues of IPRs and regulations are crucial in the 
management of the modern agricultural biotechnology 
innovation process. In Kenya, seeds and planting materials 
developed through collaborative biotechnology research 
initiatives will be protected under Plant Breeder’s Rights 
(PBRs). However, there still arise unresolved post-release 
IPR concerns, in particular, the extent to which Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) researchers may 
realize loyalty earnings, and the level of access and 
control by farmers’ over the resulting technologies. 
2.4  Biosafety Regulations 
The creation of biosafety laws are a direct reaction to 
the development of modern transgenic biotechnology. 
The process of biosafety law-making in developing 
countries has been highly influenced by internationally-
funded programs and projects that have often determined 
the direction of debates and actions (see box 1 below). 
The enacting of biotechnology policies and biosafety 
laws in Kenya has progressed slowly; stakeholders 
responsible for biosafety law-making have laboured over 
the process for an inordinately lengthy period of time, 
resulting in the development of a weak regulatory 
framework for biotechnology (Oikeh 2009) and the 
Box 1: Biosafety regulations in Kenya-defining moments
1990 Government appointed “National Committee on Biotechnology Advances and their Applications” initiates 
an evaluation of biotechnology.
1993 DGIS Netherlands programme starts and Kenyan Agricultural Biotechnology Platform (KABP) is founded 
to initiate ‘bottom up’ biotechnology development projects. 
1998 National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) publishes biosafety guidelines with KABP’s support, 
which are then used to approve a series of subsequent GMO applications. 
1999 Biosafety framework established via UNEP/GEF project2000; Government of Kenya signs Cartagena Protocol 
(UNEP-GEF, NCST).
2003 Government of Kenya ratifies Cartagena Protocol. GMO trial applications of sweet potato, Insect-Resistance 
Maize for Africa (IRMA) project, rinderpest vaccine and Bt cotton.
 
2004 Construction of Biosafety L-2 Green House Complex (BGHC) completed at KARI. Approval given for importation 
of Bt maize seed, and confined field trials. 
2005 Relevant parliamentary committees advise ABSF and NCST to formulate biotechnology policies before the 
Biosafety Bill is passed. 2006 National Biotechnology Policy approved by cabinet, uncontested 
2007 A private motion against the Biosafety Bill is debated in parliament. The bill becomes the focal point for 
debates ‘for and against’ GM crops.
2008 USAID-funded IFPRI Programme for Biosafety Systems begins. Lobbying for and against Biosafety Bill 
intensifies in and out of parliament. WEMA transgenic maize research project launched. 
2008 Biosafety Bill passed by parliament. 
2009 Biosafety Bill receives presidential assent and becomes law. Institutionalisation of National Biosafety Authority 
(NBA) to replace National Biosafety Committee (NBC). Regulations are drafted and implementation is begun. 
2010 Launch of the NBA Board on May 13.
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sluggish pace of biotech R&D (as illustrated by the WEMA 
case study in section 4.3 below). 
Prior to the acceptance of the Biosafety Act in 2009, 
the Kenyan Government had relied on fragmented 
legislation to guide its biotechnology activities (Kingiri 
2010). The purpose of the Biosafety Act was to ‘regulate 
activities in GMOs, to establish the National Biosafety 
Authority (NBA), and for connected purposes’ (Biosafety 
Act 2009: pg. 5).  The National Biosafety Committee (NBC) 
was instrumental in the formulation of the National 
Biosafety Policy and the Biosafety Bill, and has since been 
replaced by the NBA. The role of the NBA includes 
implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
to address issues of safety for the environment and 
human health, as well as carrying the responsibility of 
dealing with technical and policy issues involved in 
introducing GMOs into Kenya. The NBA Board is a broadly 
based multi-stakeholder entity composed of scientists, 
secretaries from key Kenyan ministries, directors of 
biosafety regulatory agencies, and representatives of 
farmers, consumers and the private sector.
In order to incorporate the views and opinions of the 
public whilst developing biosafety regulations, the NBA 
emphasized the need for farmer and consumer 
consultation. Sub-committees were formed in an effort 
to ensure that new biotechnologies are of relevance to 
Kenyan farmers, as well as providing a forum by which 
related concerns can be addressed. Another contentious 
issue is the current individual representation in NBA as 
opposed to institutional representation, which may 
compromise accountability and continuity –incase an 
appointed individual fails to attend meetings or 
communicate to the institution(s) s/he purports to 
represent.
2.5  Downstream impacts 
The introduction of transgenic biotechnology in Kenya 
was justified on the basis of its potential to alleviate 
poverty, hunger and malnutrition (Wafula and Falconi 
1998) by incorporating new traits such as herbicide 
tolerance, insect resistance and drought tolerance into 
crop varieties. Following the ratification of the Biosafety 
Act (2009) and the forthcoming Biosafety Regulations 
and Guidelines, efforts are underway to advance 
biotechnologies from research laboratories to farmers’ 
fields. The contemporary challenge for Kenya is whether 
the country has the required structures, technical capacity 
and farmer empowerment programmes to support the 
generation and retention of appropriate and profitable 
innovations for smallholder farmers. Additional concerns 
include the nature of the acceptance of GM crops in 
Kenya, which are associated with the lack of local level 
capacity to manage the potential GM-related health and 
environmental risks and the representation of producer/
user groups in research prioritisation and resource 
allocation. Although in recent times GM seeds and foods 
have been donated by global public and private sectors 
to alleviate poverty, hunger and malnutrition of 
smallholders in Kenya , it was only after the development 
of transgenic crops that the process began to pay 
attention to the issue of access to seeds for subsistence 
farmers. Unsurprisingly, therefore, opinions tend to be 
sharply divided on what are considered appropriate ways 
of identifying and managing the risks and uncertainties 
that surround the implementation of GM crops, and often 
centre on issues concerning transparency, participation 
and accountability in decision-making. 
In summary, the global context of agricultural 
biotechnology R&D policy is influenced by interests of 
the private sector. In developing countries in particular, 
however, the biotechnology debate is largely dominated 
by the roles of public sector and the local, contextual 
interests of smallholder and subsistence farmers. 
Although private–public collaboration have become a 
popular institutional innovation in modern technology 
transfer to developing countries, the question of the 
appropriateness of transgenics to Kenya’s smallholder 
farmers remains to be answered. In truth, multinational 
corporations tend to be the drive behind most PPPs, and 
in the process of promoting their own interests, lead 
smallholder farmers into relationships of dependency. 
In the following section, the pressing need for a 
biotechnology development strategy , which incorporates 
a strategy for balancing the private and public research 
interests of producers and users, and encourages the 
building of stronger and more stable bridges to 
institutional actors such as agro-dealers, is discussed.
3.0  Agro-dealer GMO 
Awareness, Perceptions 
and Trading Capacity
3.1  Overview
In Kenya, agro-dealers are the main conduit through 
which formal seeds are disseminated to farmers. Currently, 
there are no commercial GM cereal seeds in the country 
but development of this technology is at advanced stages 
and the seeds are expected to be released into the market 
in the near future. Naturally, once GM seeds become 
commercially available it is anticipated that agro-dealers 
will continue to play their role in the distribution of seeds. 
It is with this understanding that this study carried out 
an agro-dealer survey aimed at establishing the following: 
(i) agro-dealers’ level of awareness about GMOs and the 
sources of their information; (ii) agro-dealers’ perceptions 
of the potential benefits and risks of GMOs; (iii) the 
capacity of agro-dealers to deliver technology-specific 
information to farmers; and (iv) the ability of agro-dealers 
to communicate feedback on GMOs, including their 
associated liabilities and risks. The survey was conducted 
in two counties. Machakos was chosen for its location in 
eastern Kenya, representing low rainfall areas, whilst 
Uasin Gishu was selected for its location in western Kenya, 
representing high rainfall areas and the country’s main 
cereal growing zone. A total of 140 agro-dealers were 
selected from main towns in the five districts (three in 
Machakos and two in Uasin Gishu), as shown in Table 1. 
The data was collected between October-November 
2010, using a structured questionnaire administered by 
trained research assistants. Due to the ex-ante nature of 
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this study, there was limited agro-dealer experience with 
GM seed technology. Therefore, we sought to assess 
agro-dealer perceptions of GMOs, together with an 
exploration of their current trading practices in 
conventionally bred seeds, in an effort to predict agro-
dealer capacity for trading in GM seeds.
3.2  Characteristics of Surveyed 
 Agro-dealers
Most agro-dealer businesses are fairly young (Table 
2), with the mean age averaging at about 5.7 years, but 
agro-dealers in Uasin Gishu had been in business longer 
(6.6 years) than their Machakos counterparts (4.8 years). 
About one third of the agro-dealers had been in operation 
for just two years or less, while only 15 percent had been 
in operation for more than ten years. In Machakos, nearly 
half (46 percent) of the agro-dealers were relatively new, 
having been in operation for two years at most.
A large proportion the agro-dealership owners were 
men (71 percent) and aged about 43 years. On average, 
Uasin Gishu agro-dealers were slightly older (46.5 years) 
than those in Machakos (39.4 years). Most agro-dealership 
owners were educated, with about 93 percent having 
attained a high school education and 65 percent having 
secured a college or university education (Table 3). 
However, only about 22 percent of agro-dealership 
owners with a post high school education had training 
in agriculture, whilst the rest had received training in 
animal health (31 percent), business (28 percent), or in 
the medical field (16 percent). About 46 percent of the 
total agro-dealership owners had been trained on some 
aspects of agro-dealership, however, a greater percentage 
had received this training in Machakos (62 percent) than 
in Uasin Gishu (33 percent). Although most business 
owners had a high level of training, only 50 percent of 
them managed their businesses on a full time basis, with 
a higher proportion of business owners in Machakos (59 
percent) participating in the management of their 
businesses than their Uasin Gishu counterparts (41 
percent). 
Business size (stock value) and ownership of key assets 
differed among surveyed agro-dealers with regard to 
geographical location, gender of business owner and 
age of the business, as shown in Table 4. The average 
value of commodities stocked was 1.07 million. 
Howeveragro-dealers in Uasin Gishu, with an average 
stock value of Ksh 1.59 million, were generally larger than 
those in Machakos, with an average stock value of Ksh 
0.56 million. Further, agro-dealerships owned by women 
were much smaller (average stock value of Ksh 0.37 
million) than those owned by men (average stock value 
of Ksh 1.25 million). With regard to age, businesses aged 
below two years were almost ten times smaller (average 
stock value of Ksh 0.26 million) than those above five 
years (average stock value of Ksh 2.28 million). Only about 
30 percent of agro-dealers owned the premises where 
they operated, with higher proportions of ownership 
found in Uasin Gishu (39 percent) and among the older 
agro-dealers, and lower proportions in Machakos (21 
percent) and among younger agro-dealers. Agro-dealer 
ownership of vehicles (including motorbikes) was about 
56 percent, but was higher on average in Uasin Gishu 
(65 percent) and among older agro-dealerships (72 
Table 1: Agro-dealer Survey Sample Distribution
County District Sample size
Machakos Kathiani 23
Machakos 24
Matungulu 22
Machakos Total 69
Uasin Gishu Eldoret East 15
Wareng 56
Uasin Gishu Total 71
Total 140
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
Table 2: Agro-dealer Age Structure
County Age category in years (% of sample)
2 and below 2-5 6-10 Over 10 Mean Age
Uasin Gishu 21 35 25 18 6.6
Machakos 46 21 22 12 4.8
Total 33 28 24 15 5.7
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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percent for those older than five years), than in Machakos 
(46 percent) and among younger agro-dealers (39 
percent for those below two years).
Agro-dealers are required to obtain a trade licence 
from local authorities (county/town/municipal councils), 
which then must be certified by the Pest Control Products 
Board (PCPB) and the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate 
Services (KEPHIS). As shown in Table 5, almost all surveyed 
agro-dealers (98.6 percent) had been licensed by local 
authorities, whilst a smaller number had been registered 
with PCPB (78.3 percent) and KEPHIS (64.5 percent). While 
equal proportions of agro-dealers that were interviewed 
from both counties had trade licences, certification by 
PCPB and KEPHIS was much lower in Machakos than 
Uasin Gishu. Generally, the ability of an agro-dealer to 
obtain trade licences from relevant authorities seemed 
to increase with the number of years the business had 
been in operation. Almost all businesses that had 
operated for at least two years were likely to have been 
Table 4: Agro-dealer Size (Stock Value) and Ownership of Key Assets
Total County Business Age (Years)
Uasin Gishu Machakos Below 2 2-5 Above 5
Stock value (Ksh Million) 1.07 1.59 0.56 0.26 0.36 2.28
Own business premises 30.1 38.6 21.2 9.1 21.6 51.9
Own vehicle (% sample)
Truck/van/saloon car 47.8 58.0 36.9 36.4 40.0 63.0
Motorbike 8.2 7.2 9.2 2.3 14.3 9.3
None 44.0 34.8 53.8 61.4 45.7 27.8
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
Table 3: Education of Agro-dealership Owners and Participation in Business Management
Characteristic Uasin Gishu Machakos Total
Male (% of sample) 71.3 71.4 71.3
Age (years) 46.5 39.4 42.9
Formal Education (% sample)
None 3.8 0 1.9
Primary 8.8 1.3 5.1
Secondary 28.8 26.3 27.6
College 36.3 46.1 41.0
University 22.5 26.3 24.4
Post-secondary field of training (% respondents)
Animal health 29.5 31.6 30.7
Business 36.4 21.1 27.7
Agricultural 22.7 21.1 21.8
Medical 2.3 26.3 15.8
Teaching 9.1 0.0 4.0
Some training in agro-dealership (% 
sample)
32.5 61.6 46.4
Main Occupation (% sample)
Farming 15.0 12.0 13.5
Business 73.8 62.7 68.4
Employed government 7.5 12.0 9.7
Employed private 3.8 13.3 8.4
Participation in running business (% sample)
Full time 41.3 59.0 50.0
Part time 58.7 37.2 48.1
Never 0.0 3.8 1.9
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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licensed by local authorities. However, certification by 
PCPB was highest for the agro-dealers that were 6-10 
years old, whilst registration with KEPHIS was highest 
for businesses that had been in operation for 2-5 years. 
Additionally, local authorities seemed to be relatively 
efficient in enforcing registration requirements, 
supporting the argument that certifying agencies should 
work closely with local authorities in an effort to enforce 
the legal requirements. Local authorities could, for 
example, be mandated to deny trade licences to seed 
dealers who have not been certified by KEPHIS and PCPB.
3.3  Agro-dealer Capacity 
3.3.1  Receipt and Handling of Customer 
Information Needs 
To get data on cereal seed customer information 
needs, agro-dealers were asked to rank selected types 
of information on a scale of 1-4 (where 1 was the most 
important) and a mean rank was calculated for each 
information type (Table 7). Overall, price was found to 
be the most important information need for customers 
at the seed shops, with a mean rank of 1.69. This was 
followed by information on variety yields (3.02), seed 
rate (3.28), and days to maturity (3.32). Seed price was 
the most important information need in both counties, 
however, the order of importance of other types of 
information was different thereafter. Uasin Gishu 
customer information needs were ranked as follows: 
yields (3.36), seed rate (3.39) and days to maturity (3.41). 
On the other hand, Machakos customer information 
needs were ranked in the following order: days to 
maturity (2.61), drought tolerance (2.69) and yields (3.67). 
These regional differences in information needs may 
largely be explained by the fact that farmers in the low 
rainfall areas (Machakos) are more concerned about the 
ability of a seed/crop variety to withstand drought and 
reach maturity or to escape drought by maturing earlier, 
placing yield information needs after that of crop survival. 
On the other hand, farmers in high rainfall areas (Uasin 
Gishu) that typically have adequate rainfall to sustain 
crops to maturity, are most concerned about the yield 
potential of a variety. These results concur, in principle, 
with those of earlier studies conducted by Wekesa et al. 
(2003), who found early maturity and drought tolerance 
to be the most preferred maize characteristics by farmers 
in the coastal lowlands of Kenya (with lower rainfall); and 
Salasya et al. (2007), who reported high yield and early 
maturity (in that order) as the maize varietal characteristics 
most preferred by farmers in western Kenya, a higher 
with higher rainfall region. 
In order for customers to receive accurate and sufficient 
information, agro-dealers must first be well-informed of 
GM crops, seed varieties, and their associated risks. This 
study therefore sought to establish the level of knowledge 
that agro-dealers commanded for conventional seed 
varieties stocked, especially concerning the information 
that has been identified as most valuable to seed 
customers. This data was then used to assess the capacity 
of agro-dealers to offer this knowledge to their customers. 
The study results (Table 8) show that an estimated 27 
percent, 23 percent and 28 percent of agro-dealers were 
knowledgeable about yield potential, seed rate and days 
to maturity, respectively, of each maize variety they 
stocked. However, 8.5 percent, 12.3 percent and 11.5 
percent of agro-dealers lacked knowledge concerning 
yield potential, seed rate and days to maturity, 
respectively, for each maize variety stocked. The 
remaining agro-dealers were knowledgeable regarding 
only selected varieties. The proportion of agro-dealers 
who maintained knowledge on yields and seed rate for 
all varieties stocked was slightly higher in Uasin Gishu, 
however, the opposite was true for information on days 
to maturity. Additionally, although information brochures 
are a vital reference point for basic varietal information, 
Table 5: Proportion of Certified Agro-dealers by Region (County) and Age Category.
Certifying Agency Total 
Sample
By County By Age Category (Years)
Uasin Gishu Machakos Below 2 2-5 6-10 Above 5
Local Authorities 98.6 98.6 98.6 95.6 100 100 100
PCPB 78.3 85.7 70.6 67.4 84.6 90.6 70.0
KEPHIS 64.5 80.3 47.8 42.2 79.5 69.7 75.0
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
Table 7: Key Information Sought by Cereal Seed Customers
Information Type Rank (1=Most Important)
Uasin Gishu Machakos Overall
Price 1.27 2.13 1.69
Yields 3.36 3.67 3.02
Seed rate 3.39 3.89 3.28
Days to maturity 3.41 2.61 3.32
Drought tolerance 3.85 2.69 3.89
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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only 19 percent of agro-dealers had brochures for all 
varieties in stock, whilst a shocking 43 percent did not 
have any brochures whatsoever.
The study further assessed agro-dealers’ capacity to 
address queries posed by cereal farmers by enquiring of 
the traders whether any seed customer had asked a 
question for which they did not have sufficient 
information to answer. According to the results, about 
40 percent of agro-dealers had encountered questions 
which they found difficult to answer, with a higher 
proportion of the Uasin Gishu traders (46 percent) falling 
under this category compared to their counterparts in 
Machakos (33 percent). These results are consistent with 
assertions by Tripp (2006) and Langyintuo et al. (2008), 
that many agro-dealers are unfamiliar with the varieties 
they sell, a factor that constrains seed demand. The lack 
of knowledge on key varietal information among agro-
dealers may be a clear indication of inadequate capacity 
among the traders to satisfy information needs of cereal 
farmers, potentially limiting the correct use and maximum 
benefits attributable to the adoption of improved 
farming technologies.
3.3.2  Incidences and Handling of Seed 
Customer Complaints 
Through this study, we also sought to assess how agro-
dealers handle farmers’ complaints relating to cereal seed 
quality and whether affected farmers are eventually 
compensated for their losses. Results (see Table 9) show 
that during the last two years, 24 percent of surveyed 
agro-dealers had received complaints from customers. 
The main complaints were poor germination, 
susceptibility to diseases, malformed plant parts and 
abnormal height, reported by 55, 23, 13 and 7 percent 
of agro-dealers reporting complaints, respectively. Poor 
germination was the leading concern in both counties, 
susceptibility to diseases was a major concern in Uasin 
Gishu, and complaints of malformations and abnormal 
height were reported in Machakos. Reports of poor seed 
quality is not surprising given that more than one-third 
of agro-dealers (more than half in Machakos) were not 
certified by KEPHIS at the time of the survey (see Table 
5). In addition, cases of extensive counterfeiting in the 
Kenyan maize seed market have been reported as a major 
Table 8: Proportion of Agro-dealers with/without Information for Stocked Varieties
Information Type Had information for all varieties 
(% respondents)
Did not have information for any of 
the varieties (% respondents)
Uasin Gishu Machakos Overall Uasin 
Gishu
Machakos Overall
Yields 48.5 35.4 26.9 9.2 7.7 8.5
Seed rate 30.8 15.4 23.1 16.9 7.7 12.3
Days to maturity 12.3 43.1 27.7 13.8 9.2 11.5
Information Brochure 12.3 18.8 18.6 44.6 40.6 42.6
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
Table 9: Receipt, Handling and Fate of Cereal Seed Customer Complaints
 Uasin Gishu Machakos Total
Received Complaint from Customer (% sample) 24.3 23.2 23.7
Nature of complaint (% respondents)
Poor germination 68.8 40.0 54.8
Susceptibility to diseases 31.3 13.3 22.6
Malformed parts 0 26.7 12.9
Abnormal height 0 13.3 6.5
Other 0 6.7 3.2
Informed seed company or supplier (% respondents) 94.1 43.8 69.7
Whether the farmer was compensated (% respondents)
Yes 12.5 14.3 13.0
No 50.0 57.1 52.2
Do not know 37.5 28.6 34.8
Such complaints can negatively affect business (% respondents)
Yes 76.5 73.3 75.0
No 11.8 13.3 12.5
Do not know 11.8 13.3 12.5
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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factor that not only negatively affects the country’s seed 
industry, but also its maize production and food security 
in general (Owuor 2010; STAK 2008).
Most of the agro-dealers who received complaints 
from farmers informed the seed company or supplier 
responsible (about 70 percent on average), with a higher 
proportion of agro-dealers in Uasin Gishu taking such 
initiative (94 percent), than in Machakos (44 percent). 
Despite forwarding the complaints, 52 percent of the 
agro-dealers who took such initiative reported that the 
affected farmers were not compensated, whilst 35 
percent did not know whether or not compensation was 
made. A meager 13 percent of the agro-dealers who 
forwarded customers’ complaints reported that their 
farmers were compensated. About three quarters of the 
agro-dealers who received complaints from farmers 
believe that such complaints can negatively affect their 
businesses. These results support earlier claims of a weak 
feedback mechanism between seed companies and 
agro-dealers with regard to farmer complaints and 
preferences (Tripp 2006). Many farmers may be silently 
incurring losses as a result of the poor quality seed sold 
to them by unknowledgeable or naive agro-dealers, 
highlighting both the need for better trained traders and 
more ef fect ive  channels  for  feedback and 
compensation. 
3.3.4 Awareness, Sources of Information and 
Perceptions on GM Seeds and Crops 
Agro-dealer awareness of existence of GM seeds and 
crops was determined by asking the survey respondents 
if they had heard of GM seeds or crops, to which they 
responded ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ . Results demonstrated a fairly 
significant level of awareness of existence of GM seeds 
among surveyed agro-dealers. However, this awareness 
varied across geographical regions, agro-dealer age and 
the level of education of the business owner (Table 10). 
Overall, close to half (49 percent) of the interviewed agro-
dealers were found to be aware of existence of GM seeds, 
however, the level of awareness was higher in Uasin Gishu 
(58 percent) than Machakos (39 percent). This level of 
awareness is consistent those reported in earlier studies 
on consumer awareness of GM crops in Kenya (Gathaara 
et al. 2008; de Groote et al. 2004), which estimated that 
about half of surveyed consumers were acquainted with 
GM crops. Businesses that had been in operation for more 
than five years had a higher level of awareness of GM 
seeds (61 percent) than those that had been in operation 
for less than five years (41 percent). Further, level of GMO 
awareness was more than 50 percent where agro-dealer 
owners had a college or university education, but less 
than 32 percent where owners had not attained a college-
level education. This result once again supports the 
findings of research conducted by Gathaara et al. (2008) 
and Kimenju and de Groote (2008) that respondents with 
a higher level of education also had a higher level of 
awareness of GM seeds and crops. 
Agro-dealers who were aware of GM seeds and crops 
were provided with a list of information sources and 
asked to rank them on a scale of 1-4 (where 1 was the 
most important). Results (see Table 11) indicate that 
newspapers were the main source of information (75 
percent of respondents), followed by television, radio, 
books, schools and NGOs (53 percent, 46 percent, 21 
percent, 10 percent and 4 percent of respondents, 
respectively). Overall, the best ranked source of 
information was newspapers (with a rank of 2.37) followed 
Table 10:  Agro-dealer Owner Awareness on 
GM Seeds by Region, Age and Education Level
County/Age Category Level of GM  Seed 
Awareness (% of 
Sample)
County
Uasin Gishu 57.7
Machakos 39.1
Total 48.6
Agro-dealer Age 
0-5 years 41.2
Over 5 years 61.1
Owner’s  Education Level
Primary 28.6
Secondary 31.6
College 50.9
University 64.7
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
Table 11:  Information Sources for GM Seeds/Crops for Agro-dealers
Information Source Received Information 
(% respondents)
Rank of Importance 
(1=most important)
Uasin Gishu Machakos Overall Uasin 
Gishu
Machakos Overall
Newspaper 80.5 66.7 75.0 2.32 2.44 2.37
Television 65.9 33.3 52.9 2.76 3.15 2.91
Radio 68.3 11.1 45.6 2.24 3.67 2.81
Books 19.5 22.2 20.6 3.68 3.56 3.63
School 7.3 14.8 10.3 3.80 3.56 3.71
NGO 2.4 7.4 4.4 3.98 3.85 3.93
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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by radio (2.81), television (2.91), books (3.63), schools 
(3.71) and NGOs (3.93). However, while newspaper ranked 
first among the information sources in both counties, 
ranking of the other sources differed. In Uasin Gishu, the 
three most important sources were newspapers, radio 
and television, in that order; whilst in Machakos, sources 
were ranked in the following order: newspapers, 
television, and books/schools. The findings confirm 
research conducted by Kimenju et al. (2005), which stated 
that the mass media was the main source of information 
on GM crops for Kenyan consumers. Interestingly, 
research findings also show that although civil society 
organizations advocating for farmer and consumer rights 
have been vocal in Kenya, and specifically in the study 
areas, they have not directly engaged agro-dealers on 
GMO debates.
Agro-dealer perceptions of GM seeds were assessed 
by asking respondents who were aware of GM technology 
what their position was regarding some key aspects of 
the technology (agree, disagree or do not know), as 
shown in Table 12. The results indicate that most agro-
dealers were optimistic, allowing that compared to 
conventional seeds, GM technology would be more 
tolerant to drought (54 percent), resistant to pests (51 
percent), give better yields (69 percent), and ultimately 
help in alleviating food shortage in the country (79 
percent). This optimistic outlook among Kenyan 
consumers was also reported by Kimenju and de Groote 
(2008), who found that about 82 percent of surveyed 
consumers agreed with the view that GM crops would 
provide a solution to the global food problem. Only a 
minority of respondents agreed that GM cereal seeds 
could possess traits of improved nutritional quality (22 
percent) and resistance to herbicides (31 percent), while 
34 percent and 40 percent of the respondents were not 
aware that GM seeds could be superior in those aspects. 
A significant proportion of respondents were also 
pessimistic that compared to conventional varieties, GM 
seeds would contaminate local varieties (48 percent), 
endanger human health (46 percent), injure non-target 
organisms (40 percent), be more expensive (62 percent) 
and require more expertise to trade (61 percent). These 
results were also comparable with those found by 
Kimenju and de Groote (2008), who had reported that 
a significant proportion of surveyed consumers raised 
the following concerns over GM crops: possible injury 
to non-target species (51 percent), loss of local varieties 
(51 percent), and risk to human health if consumed (up 
to 40 percent). However, consumers in the Kimenju and 
de Groote (2008) study were very optimistic that genetic 
modification would create nutritionally superior crops, 
contrary to the view of agro-dealers which was found 
during this study. Notwithstanding the pessimism 
expressed by surveyed GM-aware agro-dealers, more 
than half of them (57 percent) reported that they would 
trade in GM seeds if they were made available in the 
market, while 26 percent were unsure whether they 
would participate in the trade. Only 17 percent of the 
respondents were adamant that they would not trade 
in GM seeds. Again, these findings are comparable with 
those established by Kimenju and de Groote (2008), that 
most consumers in Kenya (68 percent) would buy GM 
maize meal at the prevailing (or even higher) prices of 
their preferred conventional maize meal brands.
Perceptions on GM seed attributes exhibited regional 
differences. Generally, agro-dealers in Machakos rated 
all the potential positive aspects of GM seeds more highly 
than their counterparts in Uasin Gishu. By contrast, the 
rating took an opposite trend for all perceived negative 
aspects of the technology, except the high cost of the 
seed. However, these differences were significant (10 
percent level) with regards to aspects of nutrition (12 
percent in Uasin Gishu and 39 percent in Machakos), 
Table 12:  Agro-dealer Perceptions on Key Aspects of GM Seeds
Aspect of GM Seeds Agree 
(% of respondents)
Don’t Know 
(% of respondents)
Uasin Gishu Machakos Total Uasin 
Gishu
Machakos Total
Alleviate food shortage 78.0 81.5 79.4 12.2 11.1 11.8
More nutritious 12.2 38.5 22.4 34.1 34.6 34.3
More yield 63.4 77.8 69.1 19.5 18.5 19.1
Tolerate drought better 43.9 70.4 54.4 34.1 22.2 29.4
Resist pest better 42.5 63.0 50.7 27.5 29.6 28.4
Resist herbicide better 19.5 48.1 30.9 39.0 40.7 39.7
Contaminate local varieties 51.2 42.3 47.8 17.1 30.8 22.4
Dangerous to human health 50.0 40.7 46.3 30.0 29.6 29.9
Injurious to non-target 
organism
42.5 36.0 40.0 40.0 32.0 36.9
More expensive 53.7 75.0 61.5 17.1 20.8 18.5
Require more expertise to trade 63.2 58.3 61.3 21.1 12.5 17.7
Would trade in GM seeds 48.8 75.0 57.4 26.8 25.0 26.2
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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drought tolerance (44 percent in Uasin Gishu and 70 
percent in Machakos), pest resistance (43 in Uasin Gishu 
and 63 percent in Machakos), herbicide resistance (20 
percent in Uasin Gishu and 48 percent in Machakos) and 
seed cost (54 percent in Uasin Gishu and 75 percent in 
Machakos). Attributable to the high level of optimism 
about GM seeds in Machakos, the proportion of agro-
dealers who indicated that they would trade in GM seeds 
if they were available was significantly higher (75 percent) 
than in Uasin Gishu (49 percent). 
Similar regional differences in public perceptions on 
GM crops in Kenya were also reported in a recent study 
by Anunda et al. (2010), in which members of public in 
arid areas (such as Machakos) were found to be more 
optimistic about GM crops and their perceived benefits, 
and more tolerant to perceived risks, than those in high 
rainfall areas (such as Uasin Gishu). While accounting for 
these differences, the authors argued that due to frequent 
crop failures and famines experienced in low rainfall 
areas, farmers in these regions perhaps perceive that 
such crops would be better adapted to their environment 
and therefore help mitigate the challenge of droughts. 
On the other hand, farmers in the high rainfall areas (such 
as Uasin Gishu) normally harvest enough food and may 
therefore not see the need for GM crops. It is not surprising 
then, that the proportion of agro-dealers who were 
willing to trade in GM seeds was higher in Machakos 
than in Uasin Gishu.
In conclusion, this survey has shown that agro-dealers 
in Kenya are differentiated with regard to geographical 
positioning, age, gender, level of training, formality/legal 
status, and business size and asset ownership. The level 
of knowledge that agro-dealers possess of current 
commercial cereal seed varieties, coupled their ability 
to address farmers’ concerns over GM seeds and crops, 
differ with regard to the factors listed above. In general, 
agro-dealers’ understanding of key information regarding 
seed varieties, and the capacity of agro-dealers to provide 
sufficient information to farmers, are currently inadequate. 
It has been shown that although farmers may raise seed 
quality issues, there is a breakdown in the complaints 
resolution mechanism, leaving farmers’ concerns 
unaddressed. 
Research findings demonstrate that agro-dealers have 
a mixed level of awareness concerning GM seeds and 
crops, and moreover demonstrate a varied response of 
optimism and pessimism about improved varieties. Most 
agro-dealers, however, are willing to trade in GM seeds. 
Nevertheless, this study has identified areas in which 
agro-dealers have demonstrated a lack of capacity to 
provide farmers with correct information about the 
conventional varieties. Additionally, the significant 
presence of illegal seed sellers and counterfeit seeds in 
the market are problematic. Further, agro-dealerships 
located in low rainfall areas, those owned by women and 
those that have been in operation for less than five years, 
may initially be in a disadvantaged position once GM 
seed varieties are made available in the market. These 
three groups have all been identified as commanding a 
lower capital base, which may limit their capacity to make 
the infrastructural adjustments that may be required to 
accommodate GM technology (e.g. finding separate 
stores for GM seeds). Bearing in mind that GM technology 
will require a much higher level of technical skills to trade 
than conventional technologies, these findings lead to 
the concern that Kenyan agro-dealership, in its present 
state, is not yet equipped to trade in GM seeds.
4.0 Biotechnology Delivery 
Mechanisms: Select 
Cases
4.1 Overview
The case studies under review, STRIGAWAY® Technology 
and WEMA, exhibit the roles of development partners, 
international and national research systems, the private 
sector (national and multinational corporations) and 
NGOs in shaping Kenya’s agricultural biotechnology. 
STRIGAWAY® Technology is a technological package 
comprised of Imazapyr-resistant maize seed, fertilizer 
and a legume fodder seed (desmodium), which when 
applied on striga-infested maize fields are expected not 
only to suppress the weed, but also lead to increased 
maize yields. WEMA, on the other hand, is genetically 
engineered for drought-tolerance and developed to 
improve food security in Africa, especially for Arid and 
Semi-arid Lands (ASALs). Unlike STRIGAWAY® Technology, 
which has already been commercialised, WEMA is 
currently undergoing Confined Field Trials (CFTs) and 
mock-trials. STRIGAWAY® Technology is non-transgenic 
and is expected to provide a blueprint for the delivery 
of genetically engineered technologies such as WEMA. 
AATF has so far mobilized funding for the STRIGAWAY® 
Technology development and deployment, sometimes 
including subsidy packages to farmers. Both case studies 
have been advertised by AATF as royalty-free to small-
holder farmers.
4.2  Testing the agro-dealer model: the 
IR-maize project case in western 
Kenya
4.2.1 Background
In 2006, AATF identified striga eradication as a priority 
problem that required immediate action. Striga is a 
parasitic weed that destroys cereal crops such as millet, 
sorghum, and upland rice, with greatest losses occurring 
in maize crops. The effects of striga infestation are diverse 
and long-lasting, causing food insecurity in thousands 
of households and limiting rural development. Striga is 
estimated to have invaded 2.3 million hectares of maize 
crop land in fifteen countries of eastern, southern and 
western Africa, accounting for 95 percent of the 
continent’s striga-infested fields. In Kenya alone, striga 
infestation is most pronounced in western parts where 
it has invaded an estimated 210,000 hectares of maize 
farmland, resulting in total losses of about 300,000 tons 
of maize per year (AATF 2006). 
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AATF consulted with technology holders to identify 
an appropriate and effective technology that would 
reduce the threat of striga to maize production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. A project dubbed the striga control 
project came into being in 2006, with financial support 
from the Rockefeller Foundation backing the testing a 
number of technologies for striga suppression, 
improvement in yields, net returns and its compatibility 
with other striga management technologies. 
AATF was able to bring together public and private 
partners, guiding collaborative work by the employment 
of three key narratives: (i) ineffective traditional methods 
of striga controlVii demonstrated the need to devise an 
effective technology for its management; (ii) the need 
to develop a technological package that would not only 
suppress striga but also lead to maize yield increase; and 
(iii) the need to involve private sector participation due 
to the potential for profitable investments in the supply 
of seed and other farm inputs. 
4.2.2  Partnership arrangements
From the project onset, a well-coordinated public-
private partnership was considered vital for the success 
of the initiative, as quoted from a call to action by AATF 
in 2006: ‘...striga eradication requires that very different 
partners work together toward a difficult common goal’ 
(pg 15). Thus, AATF’s major role was to provide project 
stewardship in terms of technology brokerage and 
facilitating regulatory approval by KEPHIS. In this 
arrangement, several partners played different roles in 
the up-stream technology development. 
BASF, a leading Germany multinational company in 
agrochemicals, provided the chemical Imazapyr, for 
which it holds intellectual property rights and the elite 
lines – IR-maize – a part of the Clearfield’s Imazapyr 
resistance varieties. An initiative to develop a technology 
described as best-bet in striga suppression was 
undertaken by the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Centre (CIMMYT), the Tropical Soil Biology 
and Fertility Program of the International Centre for 
Tropical Agriculture (TSBF-CIAT), the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the Weizmann 
Institute of Science of Israel. These partners settled on 
STRIGAWAY® technology, which is a technological 
package comprising IR-maize seed, fertilizer, and a 
legume fodder seed (desmodium), which, when applied 
on a striga-infested maize field, is expected not only to 
suppress striga but also lead to yield increase.
Once STRIGAWAY® Technology was identified as a 
technological break-through in striga eradication, AATF 
sought to partner with local seed companies in Kenya, 
namely the Kenya Seed Company (KSC), the Lagrotech 
Ltd and the Western Seed Company (WSC), for technology 
commercialization through mass seed production and 
marketing. However, on analysis of the level of investment 
required by the partners, together with the estimated 
returns on investment, only WSC stepped forward to 
enter into a partnership with AATF. Initial impediments 
to participation by seed companies in STRIGAWAY® 
Technology deployment is illustrated in Box 2.
AATF also brought new partners on board to participate 
in activities geared towards technology deployment, 
comprising both formal and informal grass-root 
organizations, such as the Western Regional Alliance for 
Technology Evaluation (WeRATE), a consortium of NGOs, 
community-based organizations and farmers’ 
organizations. These NGOs have continued to act as 
intermediaries, despite the dissatisfaction that their role 
has caused amongst other partners during the AATF roll 
out of the Farmer Investment in Striga Technologies (FIST) 
package (the commercial model involving agro-dealers 
in STRIGAWAY® Technology, as their approach introduces 
procurement delays and even poor credit repayment.
4.2.3  Technology delivery approach
Two strategies have been employed in delivering this 
technology: Striga Technology Extension Package (STEP) 
and the Farmer Investment in Striga Technologies (FIST). 
The STEP package takes a developmental approach with 
heavy input subsidies while the FIST approach is market-
driven with credit services extended to agro-dealers and 
farmer groups.  Both packages consist of different 
quantities of IR-maize seed and fertilizer, urea and DAP, 
each with user instructions in English and Kiswahili. 
As a subsidized technological package, STEP was 
assembled by AATF in conjunction with NGOs, Resource 
Projects Kenya (RPK) and Appropriate Rural Development 
Agricultural Programme (ARDAP), to introduce IR-maize 
and related technologies to a large number of small-scale 
Box 2: Impediments to participate by Kenya 
Seed Company in STRIGAWAY Technology 
deployment
Two main challenges discouraged the company from 
this business initiative. First, the IR-maize seed would 
only command a small market share compared to 
other maize hybrids which the company had already 
established strong distribution networks throughout 
the country. Secondly, one of the technological 
requirements involved setting up a separate seed 
processing line to minimize risks associated with 
Imazapyr herbicide. This additional investment did not 
seem commercially viable to the company given that 
the company would also be required to invest in agro-
dealer training to ensure safety in handling as well as 
awareness creation among farmers. This would 
translate to high cost of the technology deployment 
which would eventually be passed to farmers. Thus, 
despite the good results of the technology in striga 
control, the company was skeptical as to whether the 
relatively high cost of the product would be acceptable 
and affordable to resource-poor smallholder farmers 
who were the most affected by the witch weed (Pers. 
Comm. Francis Ndambuki 2009).
Source: Source: Key informant interview
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farmers through farmer groups. The package was 
comprised of 250g IR-maize seed (hybrid Ua Kayongo), 
1.5kg fertilizer and user instructions, and was intended 
for application on 100m2 of severely striga-infested fields. 
With NGOs (FORMAT, ARDAP, RPK and CYEEP) mitigating 
costs by undertaking package deployment, it was made 
available to farmers at Ksh 90 per pack (approx. US 
$1.12).
 
AATF implemented the STRIGAWAY® Technology 
project commercial model of the FIST package, which 
comprises 2.5kg of IR-maize seed, fertilizer and 
desmodium seeds for application on 1000m2 (0.25 acres). 
FIST packages were deployed through farmer 
organizations on credit basis and were also made 
available through certified stockists  in Western Kenya 
(Woomer and Savala 2008). Under this strategy, seed 
production and delivery are organized as follows: (i) AATF 
enters into a credit agreement with WSC for production 
of a given quantity of IR-maize seed, which WSC then 
produces; (ii) agro-dealers obtain the seed from AATF’s 
lead partner, RPK, on credit; and (iii) agro-dealers pay 
RPK for the seed once they have sold it, and RPK, in turn, 
dispatches the money to WSC (AATF 2009).  The FIST 
approach is still being conducted on a trial basis and is 
undergoing modifications to increase input access whilst 
building sustainability in approach. One such modification 
being considered is the setting up of a revolving fund 
which will ease seed procurement and ensure timely 
delivery of seeds to farmers, whilst simultaneously 
allowing agro-dealers to purchase additional stocks 
which will in turn reduce demand risks raised by WSC 
(Pers. Comm. Gospel Omanya 2010). 
4.2.4  A critical analysis of STRIGAWAY® 
Technology deployment and use
The STRIGAWAY® Technology project exemplifies a few 
non-GM biotechnologies that are relatively successful 
in terms of deployment and use in Kenya. Farmers lauded 
the commercial model for improved maize yields, striga 
biomass and seed bank (seeds in the soil) reduction, as 
well as improved access to the technology. Farmer travel 
distance (walking) to NGO seed distribution points was 
reduced to less than two kilometers from over five 
kilometer trips previously necessary. Technology access 
to non-group farmers was also expected to improve, and 
in turn, boost sales for the seed company. However, these 
benefits and other envisioned project outcomes have 
not been fully realized due to the following challenges: 
inadequate and untimely seed supply, lack of capital, 
high price of seed, unstable seed demand and delayed 
or lack of payment for seed orders.  Also, several fears 
have been raised regarding this STRIGAWAY® Technology 
that might affect its adoption . These include fear of 
contamination due to long-term residual effects in the 
soil, contamination of nearby crops and potential harm 
to livestock and human health by the chemical Imazapyr, 
especially when inhaled. 
AATF’s key narrative in its promotion of STRIGAWAY® 
Technology is that it gives preference to technologies 
that are simple, cost effective, and provide sustainable 
value to the farmer. However, the relatively higher price 
of IR-maize seed (at Ksh 170 per kg) and the accompanying 
inputs required by the seed, drive farmer preference 
towards other hybrid maize varieties (estimated cost at 
Ksh 120 per kg). This preference was also echoed by a 
group of farmers in two focus group discussions, together 
with other key informants, who specified several other 
challenges that make this technology more costly than 
alluded to by AATF (Box 3).
Further, these challenges limit the impact of the 
technology, as narrated by one farmer representative: 
‘ARDAP supplies only 1kg of IR-maize seed, 
which is not enough to create a big impact 
on our fields, thus, it takes a long time for 
the striga to be eradicated since the 
technology works best during the long rains 
only. Seed acquisition has been a problem 
since ARDAP stopped supplying seed directly 
(during field trials) and the main challenge 
now is the price of the seed, which has gone 
up tremendously from the initial ARDAP 
price of Ksh 90 per kg to Ksh 170 per kg in 
the agro-dealers. Also, farmers are still 
required to buy by order, passing so many 
channels before reaching the agro dealers.’ 
The problem of inadequate seed supply has persisted 
since the technology was first launched. As noted in 
Manyong et al. (2008), some early adopters were quitting 
the technology altogether due to its limited access and 
because they did not find it an appropriate means to 
providing sufficient food for their families on their small, 
intensively cultivated holdings. This study established 
that on average, it takes not less than two weeks for 
ordered seed to be delivered and if a farmer gets the 
information about the availability of seed in the agro-vets 
late, then she might not achieve timely planting, which 
can lead to low yields. Interruption in information flow 
regarding quality and volume of IR-maize seed, prevailing 
high prices and unreliable delivery timing all affect 
decision-making at farm level, and in effect, the 
commercialisation agenda of AATF and WSC. 
Although AATF envisioned agro-dealers as playing a 
key role in IR-maize seed advocacy, technology delivery, 
and acting as extensionists, the farmers interviewed 
revealed that most of the technical knowledge they have 
on IR-maize seed was acquired from NGO extension staff, 
field days and farmer trainings as opposed to agro-
dealers. According to farmers, attempts to solve emerging 
issues take the following approach: Farmer    →  Training 
of Trainer   →  Field Officer   →   Project Coordinator    → 
NGO Consortium in the region. This means that farmers 
are yet to see agro-dealers as a source of technical 
knowledge on IR-maize seed.
The STRIGAWAY® Technology is royalty-free, but 
concerns have been raised over the likelihood of tying 
smallholder farmers into a dependency relationship with 
multinational corporations who supply the associated 
inputs. WSC argues that because of the low buying 
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capacity of agro-dealers and their inability to pay upfront, 
seed companies are not willing to give agro-dealers 
inputs on credit, unless that credit is guaranteed. The 
company also notes that although the AATF credit model 
provides some form of guarantee, its design introduces 
delays in seed procurement and there have been cases 
of uncollected ordered seeds, affecting revenue flow. To 
mitigate this risk, the Company has put more emphasis 
on confirmation of orders and receipt of down payment 
before it produces the quantity ordered by AATF. 
According to agro-dealers in the region, the proportion 
of IR-maize seed demanded in 2010 was estimated at 14 
percent, as compared to other varieties whose demand 
stood at 86 percent . The market share of IR-maize seed 
is minimal due to agro-dealers dealing with a majority 
Box 3: Benefits and challenges of adopting STRIGAWAY Technology
Deployment of the STRIGAWAY® Technology 
in western Kenya presents both benefits and 
challenges. Farmers lauded the commercial 
model for improved maize yields, reduced 
striga infestation and improved access to the 
technology. But these benefits have not been 
fully realized due to several challenges. For 
instance, the high cost of the technology 
throughout the production process has 
contributed to low adoption rates, and in 
some cases has even led to abandonment of 
the technology in preference to the 
conventional hybrids.
Benefits:
Farmers in the FDGs reported benefits in terms 
of yield gains while reducing striga biomass 
and improved access to the technology 
through local NGOs and agro-dealers in 
nearby local markets. In the past, farmers used 
to walk long distances of 10 km to buy maize 
seed. Some benefits of the STRIGAWAY® 
Technology were well articulated by the 
following farmer:
John* reports: I pulled and buried striga on my two-acre farm for the past 17 years and the problem only grew worse. 
During a farmer field day in 2005, we learned about herbicide-treated maize seeds and I was one of the first farmers 
in the community to receive the new IR-maize seed. Ua Kayongo (the first IR-maize hybrid seed released in the region) 
has provided the best crop of maize that I have ever grown. I used to get 40kg from one-half acre but when I started 
planting IR-maize seed, I now harvest 200kg of grain from the same piece of land.
Farmer Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in
Bukhalalire village, western Kenya (Jan 2011)
Challenges:
The STRIGAWAY® Technology faces many challenges in western Kenya as most farmers traditionally use retained 
grain as seed and the formal seed systems in the region are not well developed for the supply of improved seed 
to farmers. First, the main challenge has been the high price of the seed which increased from the initial ARDAP 
price of Ksh 90 (US $1.12) per kg to Ksh 170 (US $2.05) per kg in the agro-vet shops. Second, lack of information 
on the availability of the seed also remains a challenge since seed passes many channels before reaching agro-
dealers and farmers. Third, some agro-dealers fear trading in the IR-maize seed as they cannot sustain their 
businesses due to low demand by farmers and also the time the seed takes to reach the agro-dealers. This makes 
agro-dealers unreliable as source of the seed. For instance, farmers have often been disappointed by not getting 
the seed to buy from the agro-dealers on time and in enough quantities. Due to these challenges, on average 
farmers buy 6kg of IR-maize seed and plant less than 0.75 an acre per season while 10kg of other hybrid maize 
seed varieties is bought, planting one acre per season. 
Source: Agro-dealer Survey 2010
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of smallholder farmers whose incomes are very low, 
making input affordability equally low. This means that 
the level of IR-maize seed purchases will remain low 
unless there are external interventions to stimulate and 
sustain demand. Further, RPK, the NGO administering 
input credit on behalf of AATF, has had to deal with 
incomplete repayments and loan defaults which affect 
seed procurement for the next season, making the agro-
dealer input credit model unsustainable. 
AATF’s principle of ‘...advancing market-led paradigms 
for greater returns on investments on additional input 
use, new production technologies and farm practices 
for increased household incomes and related agribusiness’ 
is therefore faced with a myriad of challenges. It has been 
observed that there is a tendency to move back to 
developmental approaches, characterized by heavy 
donor support, instead of pursuing market-driven 
approaches. 
Apart from promoting royalty-free striga-control 
technology, AATF took up a stewardship role which, 
according to the project brief,xi  involves the ‘development 
and implementation of a technology stewardship plan 
focused on seed stockists and maize farmers’. Under the 
project stewardship plan, AATF has so far achieved the 
following:
i. Creation of technology awareness through 
demonstrations, field days, printed and electronic 
media, translation of user guidelines into local 
languages in order to reach out to more farmers, 
participation in trade fairs and exhibitions. 
ii. Facilitation of seed production and distribution.
iii. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) conducted on a 
regular basis, however, more personnel are required 
to collect and collate data, synthesize information, 
recommend actions and disseminate findings to 
relevant stakeholders.
The prime movers of STRIGAWAY® Technology namely 
CIMMYT and WSC, have reservations over the research 
and extension capacity of AATF as it undertakes 
stewardship roles. In particular, AATF has amassed an 
increasing repertoire of roles and new partners, leading 
to delays in the technology deployment process and 
inefficiencies in M&E (see Box 4). 
Upon seeking to know the position of AATF regarding 
administrative delays and capacity, Dr. Gospel Omanya 
was forthright in stating that ‘…the department is 
understaffed, we have collected a lot of data which has 
not been analyzed wholly to give appropriate guidance 
in redesigning delivery models and other aspects of the 
technology’ (Pers. Comm., AATF 2010). 
AATF has had to intervene on several occasions in 
terms of mobilizing resources for technology deployment 
and thus, is obligated to ensure appropriate use of the 
funds in order to be accountable to the financier(s), 
explaining its extended roles (see Box 5).
AATF supports RPK in its credit scheme administration 
task, a strategy which, farmers and WSC argue, introduces 
delays in seed acquisition. It would be expected that if 
indeed the FIST package is a commercial model, there 
should be no need of NGO involvement, which blurs the 
commercial nature of the model and instead makes it 
appear to be a developmental approach. 
In summary, the case study of STRIGAWAY® Technology 
exemplifies the process of evolving partnerships in 
technology development and deployment by bringing 
on board new partners to deal with challenges 
experienced in technology delivery. For instance, in its 
pursuit of striga eradication, the project expanded from 
an original network of four formal institutions to that of 
a diversity of formal and informal actors at different levels 
of the ImR-maize seed supply chain. 
In as much as evolving partnerships are discernible 
in technology deployment, the case of STRIGAWAY® 
Technology introduces high transaction costs in the 
Box 4: Challenges for the optimal perfomance 
of WSC
It is the view of WSC that administrative delays at AATF 
contribute to less than optimal outcomes. For instance, 
after approval by KEPHIS, a process which took one 
year, it took another 12 months to be allowed to start 
producing and marketing the IR-maize seed. This was 
due to the conditions of multiple associated 
agreements, which have now been signed officially 
this year (2010) (long after WSC started producing and 
marketing IR-maize seed).  Secondly, the funding 
pledged by BASF in 2006 towards acquisition of 
machinery and equipment had not yet been received 
in 2010. The company has been forced to borrow 
money from other internal sources to deploy the 
technology, train its staff, agro-dealers and farmers. 
Third and finally, the current input-credit strategy 
being administered by AATF through RPK is also 
proving to be a major risk where the orders are 
sometimes not honored and paid for as agreed. This 
makes the company incur huge losses (Pers. Comm. 
Osman, WSC 2010).
Box 5: Why the additional roles for AATF?
Once the technology was developed and ready for 
large-scale testing and awareness-creation, there was 
no institution (among the prime movers of the 
technology) prepared to invest in such an undertaking. 
AATF stepped in and mobilized funds for the 
multiplication of Ua Kayongo by WSC, which would 
be subsidized and deployed through local level NGOs 
and farmer organizations.  On a second occasion, upon 
launching the commercial STRIGAWAY® Technology 
model, AATF realized that capital constraints impeded 
agro-dealers from acquiring substantial stocks of 
IR-maize and again stepped in to set-up an input-credit 
scheme, through an agro-dealer network which would 
build their capacity to stock more of the IR-maize 
packages (Pers. Comm. Gospel Omanya, AATF 
2010). 
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procurement process and also raises political economic 
concerns over whether this technology can be sustained 
as a purely commercial model for the target users. If 
sustainability is possible, which elements of sustainability 
should be put in place for a self-propelling commercial 
model with few actors? Who should these actors be and 
which linkages are vital in strengthening actor networks?
Although this project was designed with a commercial 
motive of promoting agribusiness PPPs, seed companies 
have to date borne substantial additional risk compared 
to participating public sector (i.e. government), farmers, 
farmer organizations and agro-dealers or stockists. This 
is because a seed company’s return on investment is 
hinged on seed variety adoption, strong market networks, 
farmer repayment for input credit, own production risks, 
and those risks associated with delays in release of funds 
for additional investment. 
The goals of the STRIGAWAY® Technology project 
would be more effectively achieved by paying greater 
attention to the needs of seed producers, grassroots 
collaborators and maize farmers. Financing innovations, 
especially for seed companies and their network of agro-
dealers, would be additional tool in enhancing capital 
access. For instance, facilitating linkages between agro-
dealer networks and financing institutions is recognized 
as a welcome move in increasing access to capital and 
seed business volumes. An alternative model is to set up 
a revolving fund, which is considered by AATF as a 
measure to build sustainability elements in the IR-maize 
seed technology deployment and use processes. Aside 
from the high price of seed, farmers’ concerns also relate 
to human, livestock and environmental risks which have 
not been adequately addressed, despite being raised 
more than five years ago. Neither agro-dealers nor NGO 
extension workers have the capacity to educate farmers 
on these risks, as they have little or no information about 
the associated risks nor are they aware of possible 
mitigation measures. Therefore, the commercial/agro-
dealer model adopted by AATF in the deployment of 
STRIGAWAY® Technology has been faced with several 
challenges which need to be addressed in order to 
achieve effective delivery to smallholder farmers in parts 
of western Kenya, as well as attaining possible replication 
in the WEMA project in the low rainfall regions of eastern 
Kenya. 
4.3  Agro-dealer challenges of deploying 
GM seeds in Kenya: an anticipatory 
case study of WEMA
4.3.1  Backgroundxii
Water Efficient Maize for Africa is a public-private 
partnership, led by the AATF with the aim of addressing 
the devastating effects of drought through the 
development of drought-tolerant maize and its extension 
to small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Seed 
development is being achieved through conventional 
breeding, marker-assisted breeding and biotechnology. 
Launched in March 2008, the project is implemented in 
five African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, 
Mozambique and Uganda) by a consortium of actors 
including AATF (the lead partner), CIMMYT, national 
agricultural research systems in project countries, and 
the private multinational seed corporation, Monsanto. 
The project is funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF) and Howard G. Buffett Foundation, 
to the tune of US $47 million over the first five years.
The project is anchored on a philosophy that links 
Africa’s food insecurity and poverty to drought, and 
identifies biotechnology as a powerful tool that can be 
used to improve drought tolerance in Africa’s staple crop, 
maize. This is also seen as a key strategy for spurring a 
new Green Revolution in Africa.  According to the project 
brief available at AATF’s website:
“Africa is a drought-prone continent, 
making farming risky for millions of small-
scale farmers who rely on rainfall to water their 
crops. Maize is the most widely grown staple 
crop in Africa – more than 300 million Africans 
depend on it as their main food source – and 
it is severely affected by frequent drought. 
Drought leads to crop failure, hunger, and 
poverty. Climate change will only worsen the 
problem. Drought tolerance has been 
recognised as one of the most important 
targets of crop improvement programs, and 
biotechnology has been identified as a 
powerful tool to achieve significant drought 
tolerance by the United Nation’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization. Identifying ways to 
mitigate drought risk, stabilise yields, and 
encourage small-scale farmers to adopt best 
management practices is fundamental to 
realising food security and improved 
livelihoods for the continent. AATF is leading 
a public-private partnership called Water 
Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) to develop 
drought-tolerant African maize using 
conventional breeding, marker-assisted 
breeding, and biotechnology…”xiii
Based on this narrative, WEMA builds on an earlier 
project known as Drought Tolerant Maize for Africa 
(DTMA), a programme that uses conventional breeding 
techniques, by introducing biotechnological components, 
such as marker assisted breeding (MAB) and genetic 
engineering. DTMA is implemented by CIMMYT with 
funding from the BMGF. The justification for use of MAB 
and genetic modification tools in WEMA is that drought 
tolerance is a complex phenomenon that can only be 
achieved through a combination of networked factors, 
the realization of which cannot come through 
conventional breeding tools alone. In this context, MAB 
is a useful tool for assessing the breeding value of 
individual genomic regions of maize germplasm under 
moisture stressed conditions. Genetic engineering 
enables a breeder to combine genes from various 
geographical regions and organisms and, with high 
precision, introduce a single gene that directly affects 
the complex physiological pathways resulting in 
increased yields under drought conditions. It is argued 
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that the realisation of drought tolerance traits in seeds 
would take decades, or even be impossible to achieve 
using traditional breeding tools, yet, there is urgent need 
to avail drought tolerant maize varieties to farmers in 
SSA.
4.3.2 Project approach and anticipated 
outputsXIV
A four-component approach is used in this project. 
First is the technical component, which aims to improve 
drought tolerance of African maize varieties. Second is 
the regulatory component, the objective of which is to 
develop the capacity of national and international 
product development teams to conduct risk assessments 
and prepare safety data dossiers for submission to 
regulatory authorities, for approval of confined field 
testing of the drought-tolerance trait. Third is the 
communication component, which aims to promote 
public awareness and consumer acceptance of developed 
maize varieties, test this maize in project countries, and 
develop incentives for its rapid deployment to needy 
smallholder farmers. Fourth is the governance 
component, the objective of which is to conduct and 
manage regulation of the project’s research, product 
development, and innovations.
To achieve its objectives, the project draws on the 
expertise and capacity of each of the key consortium 
partners. The non-profit making organization, AATF, is 
the partner through which the project is funded and 
managed. They provide expertise in leadership, PPP 
management, technology stewardship and project 
management. CIMMYT, an international agricultural 
research organization, provides high-yielding maize 
varieties that are adapted to African conditions and 
expertise in conventional breeding and testing for 
drought tolerance. The private commercial multinational 
seed corporation, Monsanto, provides germplasm, 
advanced breeding tools and expertise, and drought-
tolerance transgenics. The public national agricultural 
research system contributes expertise in field testing and 
seed multiplication and distribution.
The project is divided into two phases. During the first 
phase (research and development), new African drought-
tolerant maize varieties with the potential to increase 
yields by 20-35 percent under moderate drought, will 
be developed. Under the second phase, market and 
reliability trials for the varieties will be undertaken, during 
which farmers will be able to assess their value. The two 
phases attempt to balance the uncertain dynamics of 
technology investment, risk and uncertainty in farmers’ 
decision making, which, according to some studies, has 
tended to limit the adoption of drought-tolerant varieties 
(Brooks et al. 2009). In an effort to boost adoption, 
varieties to be developed under WEMA are expected to 
be distributed royalty-free, through AATF, to African seed 
companies, who in turn will supply them on a commercial 
basis (and at the going rate of maize seed) to smallholder 
farmers. The royalty-free transgenic material and the PPP 
institutional arrangement (with AATF as the technology 
broker) differentiate WEMA from its predecessor DTMA. 
It is expected that WEMA-developed transgenic drought-
tolerant varieties will be accessible to farmers between 
2015 and 2017. 
4.3.3 Project Achievements and Challenges
According to the reports of various forums, by 
September 2010 the project had made considerable 
progress (see Oikeh 2010a; Oikeh 2010b; AATF 2009). For 
example, the development of CFT sites and conducting 
of mock trials, using conventional drought-tolerant 
varieties, had begun in all but one of the project countries. 
In addition, the partner countries, with the exception of 
Mozambique are at advanced stages of implementing 
CFTs: South Africa leads the pack, having harvested the 
first transgenic hybrids in May 2010. Kenya and Uganda 
had secured approval for CFTs for transgenics, which had 
been scheduled for October/November 2010, while 
Tanzania’s application to carry out similar trials was 
awaiting final decision from authorities. Mozambique 
was planning to conduct mock trials in September 2010, 
and apply for CFTs in October 2010. WEMA had further 
trained more than 35 journalists from project countries 
in science and biotechnology reporting and made 
deliberate efforts to popularize the project locally and 
internationally.
These achievements have not come without 
challenges. The main challenge encountered so far has 
been bottlenecks in regulatory frameworks. In most of 
the project countries, the regulatory framework for 
biotechnology has been weak, with slow progress in 
regulatory framework development as a result of ‘stops 
and starts’ (Oikeh 2009). In Kenya, for instance, the 
regulatory framework for biotechnology was not in place 
until February 2009 when the Biosafety Act (2008) was 
approved. This Act sets out a strategy for the ‘regulat[ion 
of ] activities in genetically modified organisms...
establish[ment of] the National Biosafety Authority, and... 
connected purposes’, as explained in Page 5. This delay 
meant that WEMA activities in Kenya could not progress 
as fast as in South Africa, where the biotechnology 
regulatory framework had been in place much earlier 
(as already stated above, South Africa had completed 
the first CFT with WEMA transgenics by May 2010, while 
Kenya was still grappling with the regulatory challenges). 
Other challenges have included managing the large and 
dispersed project team; losing (highly-trained) key staff; 
handling communication issues around biotechnology 
and risk; and managing issues around confidentiality and 
intellectual property (Oikeh2010a; Oikeh 2010b).
4.3.4 Future challenges and their implications 
for agro-dealers
In the context of the intertwined food crises, poverty 
and general development challenges facing SSA, it is 
imperative that modern farming technologies are sought 
and applied in the region, in order that meaningful 
economic development is achieved. The goal of WEMA, 
in principle rhetoric if not in practice, resonates well with 
this agenda. However, a number of criticisms can be made 
of their approach, particularly the genetic modification 
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element, which presents the project with key future 
challenges that can potentially constrain its impact in 
Kenya. These challenges are examined from a political 
economy perspective, which considers the technical, 
communication, regulatory and governance components 
of the project.
Climate change and variability present technical 
challenges for policy makers, who must necessarily 
employ a range of response strategies, rather than 
focusing on one option such as development of a single 
maize variety.xv For example, it is known that 
environmental changes create new burdens for poor 
smallholder farmers, who are already faced with a number 
of challenges such as crop failure, food and income 
insecurity, malnutrition and ill-health. Thus, droughts and 
other challenges for smallholders are interconnected and 
mutually reinforcing . Under these circumstances, 
drought-tolerant crop varieties, are limited in terms of 
how they address (or not) patterns of differential 
vulnerability and climatic variability between, and within, 
regions and social groups.
This challenge is particularly acute in low-rainfall areas 
(such as Machakos), where there are locally specific 
variations in the timing and intensity of rainfall. The AATF 
and other WEMA project collaborators consider genetic 
modification to be the main technological solution to 
droughts in such areas. This solution has been challenged 
by its critics on the basis that AATF has ignored other 
technologies and management strategies. 
‘…the strategy substitutes ‘drought 
tolerance’ with ‘helping plants to cope with 
the stress of drought’ - a more rubbery, 
unquantified and undefined concept open 
to interpretation,’ said Bob Phelps of Gene 
Ethicsxvii .
The second technical challenge of WEMA is loss of 
diversity in farming systems. The Inter-cropping and 
planting of diverse varieties (inter-and intra-species 
diversity) helps maintain agro-biodiversity which acts 
as a protection against climate change, unpredictable 
weather, pests, weeds, diseases and even market 
variabilityxviii . It is feared that this would not be the case 
when WEMA becomes the dominant variety in any 
region.
The third technical and policy challenge relates to the 
politics of formal and informal seed systems. 
Biotechnology antagonists argue that ‘biotechnology 
crops lack the latitude that evolution and seed saving 
provide and the genetic diversity to function across 
numerous conditions.xix Of particular concern is the 
impact that expanding an extension of the coverage of 
formal seed system will have on the informal seed system, 
and how a reduced informal market will impact 
livelihoods. As noted by Brooks et al. (2009), attempts of 
eroding the informal seed system, especially in drought 
prone areas, would leave smallholder farmers more 
vulnerable to seed and food insecurity because many 
smallholder farmers plant local maize seed, saved from 
the previous year, or from farmer exchange within the 
community, rather than purchase commercial seed from 
their local agro-dealers and stockists. These farmers are 
reluctant to invest their scarce resources in farm inputs 
given the unpredictable climate and frequent occurrence 
of drought, and their high confidence in the quality and 
reliability of local seeds within local agro-ecological 
conditions.xx It is also feared that GM WEMA varieties may 
have gene flow effects on local maize varieties, and will 
not allow saving and replanting of seeds. 
The application of biotechnology in agriculture and 
particularly genetic engineering is a relatively new 
technology not only in Kenya but also in Africa at large. 
Hence, there is little awareness about both the process 
and its products. In Kenya for example, studies estimate 
awareness of GMOs among the general public at around 
50 percent (Gathaara et al. 2008; de Groote et al. 2004). 
According to the Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Science and Technology in Kenya that 
attended a WEMA regional meeting of stakeholders in 
Johannesburg in April 2010 , there is a general lack of 
acceptance of these foods. This further implies that if 
agro-dealers are to effectively participate in deploying 
WEMA products and awareness campaigns, safety 
assurance to humans not only among the agro-dealers 
but also among their immediate customers (farmers) and 
the general public, will be required. 
Even among those who are aware of GMOs, opinions 
differ with respect to the characteristics and/or impacts 
(real or perceived) on humans and the environment. 
Oikeh (2010b) argues that although there have been 
efforts to inform the public about GM technology, such 
initiatives are ‘hijacked by anti-GM lobby groups, who…
demonise GMOs’ (Page 38). This is a hurdle that WEMA 
must overcome if the products of its investment are to 
be widely distributed and adopted and cause any 
meaningful impact. For example, in the agro-dealer 
survey section, we reported that 46 percent of the 
GM-aware entrepreneurs were of the view that GMOs 
are harmful to human health. If agro-dealers are to be 
effectively involved in deploying WEMA seeds, then they 
will need to be assured that the products are safe to 
humans, so that they can in turn assure farmers of the 
same and boost their chance of making sales.
Lack of capacity among the relevant regulatory 
authorities to enforce agro-dealership laws, as evidenced 
by the presence of unlicensed agro-dealers, is particularly 
problematic in low rainfall areas where WEMA products 
are targeted (Odame and Muange 2011). In addition, the 
agro-dealer survey section reported the presence of fake 
seeds in the market as well as customer complaints 
regarding seed quality. 
An experience with GM maize in South Africa shows 
that the presence of poor quality seed in the market, 
even though it may be from genuine suppliers, results 
in significant losses that necessitate compensation. This 
case is contained in an article by Travis English on August 
27, 2010, which reports that:
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‘… in South Africa in 2009, Monsanto’s 
genetically modified maize failed to produce 
kernels and hundreds of farmers were 
devastated. According to Mariam Mayet, 
environmental attorney and director of the 
Africa Centre for Biosafety in Johannesburg, 
some farmers suffered up to an 80 percent 
crop failure. While Monsanto compensated 
the large-scale farmers to whom it directly 
sold the faulty product, it gave nothing to the 
small-scale farmers to whom it had handed 
out free sachets of seedsxxii.’
The possibility of a similar occurrence in Kenya is high 
due to poor enforcement of seed trade laws.
Furthermore, the agro-dealer survey reported a very 
weak feedback mechanism between farmers and seed 
companies with regard to the former’s complaints and 
priorities. This is evidenced by the small proportion of 
agro-dealers who forwarded customer’s complaints to 
seed suppliers (especially in the low rainfall areas targeted 
by WEMA) and the even smaller proportion of reported 
compensations. This finding points to the possibility of 
smallholder farmers incurring losses that cannot be 
compensated because they purchased GM seeds from 
illegal agro-dealers or because the (fake) GM seeds they 
purchased cannot be traced to the company purported 
to have produced or distributed them. If agro-dealers in 
Kenya are to be effective in disseminating WEMA 
products, then there is need to strengthen the capacity 
of seed industry regulatory authorities to ensure 
compliance, as well as the capacity of agro-dealers to 
negotiate feedback and compensation between farmers 
and seed companies. 
In light of the above arguments, WEMA has to 
overcome the challenge posed by the overall feeling of 
critics that GM technology is being pushed down the 
throat of the Kenyan government and the public by 
powerful external forces. The critics seem to be of the 
opinion that the apparently philanthropic biotechnology 
activities being carried out in the country favor private 
companies and foreign interests and do not seem to 
adequately regard farmers’ concerns. 
These concerns were also recently confirmed by Cooke 
and Downie (2010 of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies in their global report on food 
security that focused on African perspectives on GM 
crops. The authors reported that (Page 13): 
‘Non-governmental observers express a 
concern that because many of the research 
partnerships are externally funded, either by 
Western donor governments or private 
interests, research priorities may be skewed 
toward external or commercial interests and 
not coordinated in a way that meets Kenyan 
national needs or the needs of the smallholder 
farmer.’
An example of these commercial interests was 
revealed in The BioenergySite  in December 19, 2008, in 
which the US Grain Council Director in the Mediterranean 
and Africa was quoted as saying that: 
‘The passage of this (Kenya’s Biosafety) bill 
is a direct result of past Council efforts in the 
region. It also shows that pro-biotech forces 
in Africa have won a significant battle in the 
biotechnology debate.’ 
In addition, the Council’s Director of Biotechnology 
was also quoted as saying: 
‘Our activities in Africa are a good example 
of how Council programmes on biotechnology 
can pay off in the long run... I’m very pleased 
to see that things worked out so well (Passing 
of the Biosafety Bill) in Kenya, a country that 
has emerged as a leader in biotechnology in 
east Africa.’
If the sentiments expressed in this section are anything 
to go by, there seems to be plausible concern that while 
genetic modification is a potential tool for fighting 
drought in SSA, it is not a silver bullet in that regard. In 
a press release dated August 25th, 2010, by Community 
Alliance for Global Justice’s AGRA Watch Program, Travis 
English asserts that one conclusion by the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development (IAASTD) report of 2008, 
was that ‘small-scale agro-ecological farming is more 
suitable for the third world than the industrial agricultural 
model’ – which includes the use of GM technology, 
advocated for by powerful philanthropic organizations 
and private multinational farm input companies..’ Locally, 
a senior representative of the Kenya National Federation 
of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP) was recently quoted 
by Cooke and Downie (2010) as saying that there are 
numerous technologies (other than genetic engineering) 
in the country that haven’t been fully explored. 
Widespread distribution of WEMA products in Kenya 
is also likely to face the same limitations encountered in 
trading commercially available dryland maize 
technologies. Langyintuo et al. (2008) argue that 
conventionally-bred drought-tolerant maize varieties 
that increase maize yields by over 20 percent are available, 
but constraints relating to release and accessibility of 
seed hinder their widespread use by farmers. The authors 
further argue that farm-level constraints, such as lack of 
awareness of available varieties, the high price of seed 
relative to grain, farmers’ reluctance to change from their 
old practices, inadequate access to credit to buy seed 
and complementary inputs and inadequate extension 
services, constrain demand by farmers for current 
varieties. This problem is compounded by agro-dealer 
constraints, the most critical being lack of credit to 
purchase and deliver adequate quantities of seed (Odame 
and Muange 2010). These constraints cast doubts over 
the capacity of agro-dealers to deploy WEMA products 
once they are released. To alleviate these constraints, 
activities will be required that raise farmer demand for 
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improved maize varieties (WEMA products), and increase 
agro-dealer capacity to procure and distribute adequate 
stocks of the varieties to farmers.
5.0 Conclusion
The place of the small-scale agro-dealer in the New 
Green Revolution for Africa has been central in many 
programmes and projects initiated by governments, the 
private sector and public-private sector initiatives across 
Africa. The role of agro-dealers is to not only supply agro-
inputs but also to act as a link between private seed 
companies, technology developers and farmers. Thus, 
they have a responsibility for offering technical advice 
(i.e. varietal information, input options, yields, agronomic 
practices, etc.) to farmers and providing feedback 
between actors in the input supply chains. In Kenya, 
public and private actors are committing substantial 
effort and resources to organise and facilitate agro-
dealers in delivering novel technologies and allied 
information, in line with the Africa-wide initiatives of the 
New Green Revolution. Among the key technologies to 
be delivered are GM cereal seeds that have been 
developed for resistance to harsh environmental 
conditions, such as drought and insect pests, and 
enhanced nutritional quality. 
From a political economy perspective, this study 
sought to investigate the policy and institutional 
environment shaping agricultural biotechnology 
development and deployment in Kenya, within which 
agro-dealers act as vehicles for the delivery of novel 
technologies such as agricultural biotechnology and 
allied information. The study drew on the insights gained 
from two case studies. The first test case is IR-maize, which 
is non-transgenic but already commercialized, and the 
other is WEMA, which is transgenic and undergoing 
confined field trials in Kenya.  IR-maize technology is 
expected to inform the delivery of WEMA technology to 
Kenyan smallholder farmers, with the agro-dealer at the 
centre. 
The established case of IR-maize has demonstrated 
that the current commercial model of agro-dealership 
has faced several challenges and, as a result, is not 
efficient in delivering novel technologies. First, agro-
dealers lack adequate knowledge of the current 
commercial cereal seed varieties and are ill-equipped to 
address farmers’ concerns about the existing technologies. 
Partly to blame are the ineffective complaints resolution 
mechanism and the poor linkages between technology 
developers and agro-dealers. The weak regulatory system 
has led to a mushrooming of illegal agro-dealers operating 
within the formal seed system that are inadequate at 
linking technology users and developers/organizations 
involved in deployment. 
Second, agro-dealers in Kenya operate on a small 
capital base, which limits their ability to procure 
meaningful stocks for new technological products. In 
addition, they are forced to diversify into stocking not 
only inputs but also general merchandise to buffer 
against times of low sales resulting from the seasonal 
nature of demand. Although most agro-dealers are 
optimistic about new technological products like GM 
seeds, their main concern is whether the price of the 
technology (as a whole) can stimulate sufficient demand 
to warrant positive returns on the agro-dealers’ 
investment. Such concerns are evident among stockists 
of IR-maize, who claim that the high price of the IR-maize 
seed reduces its demand relative to other conventional 
maize varieties. Thus, agro-dealers have called for 
stimulation of demand, achieved through assured 
markets for output and stability in output prices.. 
Third, regulatory enforcement has been a major 
constraint in the seed trade, leaving loopholes for trading 
in fake and poor quality seeds by unlicensed agro-dealers. 
Despite lacking adequate capacity to enforce regulations, 
the three agencies in charge of regulating agro-dealership 
(local authorities, PCPB and KEPHIS) often work in 
isolation, which further limits their overall impact. Unless 
synergies are developed between these agencies, illegal 
agro-dealers and poor quality, adulterated and counterfeit 
inputs will continue to flourish, ruining the efforts geared 
towards agro-dealers delivering a Green Revolution in 
Kenya. 
So, with the introduction of GM technologies in Kenya 
and the likelihood that the agro-dealer model will be 
used in its deployment, to what extent are the needs 
and priorities of farmers considered? Based on the survey, 
farmers and agro-dealers welcome the potential benefits 
of GM crops and seeds: food security, yield improvement, 
drought tolerance and disease resistance. However, they 
are wary of perceived risks such as gene flow (causing 
marginalisation or disappearance of local/traditional 
varieties,) health and environmental risks, reliance on 
expensive external inputs, and seed quality issues. These 
fears are caused by information asymmetries among 
actors resulting from weak linkages and poor 
communication between the front-end and back-end 
stakeholders. In addition, much of this information is held 
by the technology developers but not by regulators, 
which further limits the effectiveness of regulation, 
participants in the Biosafety Workshop, 2010, pointed 
out: ‘…you cannot regulate a technology unless you know 
or understand it.’
Seed security is a centre-piece of policy and regulatory 
development. The issue of access to seed has been given 
a policy platform through the National Seed Industry 
Policy (2009) and the Biosafety Act (2009). A general 
concern, however, is that these policy developments 
were driven by stakeholders in the formal seed sector, 
despite the fact that this sector provides less than 20 
percent of seed demand in the country, with the rest 
being supplied by the informal seed system.  Development 
of regulations to guide enforcement of the Biosafety Act 
2009 has not only ignored this reality but also excluded 
the participation of key stakeholders such as civil society 
organizations. The likely outcome will be heightened 
practical challenges of regulating the informal seed 
system in the face of new technologies such as GM seeds, 
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which call for strict adherence to new aspects of seed 
laws such as plant breeders rights or patenting. In 
conclusion, agro-dealers may not have the capacity to 
provide effective linkages for deployment and local level 
regulatory control of new seeds.
End Notes
i   http://www.answers.com/topic/biotechnology
ii   The reason for public sector involvement was the dependency 
on the international public goods and national agricultural 
research capacity to develop new varieties adapted to local 
conditions. 
iii  The emphasis is on cereal seeds because they are the main 
crops important for food security. For example, maize is an 
important staple crop, averaging over 80 percent of total 
cereals (rice, wheat, millet and sorghum) (Mbote 2010). Poor 
maize yields result in food shortage and famine in Kenya 
(see http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Steps%204%20
Maize%20Security%20does%20not%20equal%20Food%20
security.pdf ).
iv  This was revealed by a study carried out on investment in 
biotechnology in Kenya, Mexico, Indonesia and Zimbabwe 
during 1985-1997 (Jansen et al. 2000).
v Awareness here refers only to having at least some 
information that GM crops exist. Cereal GM seeds are not yet 
commercially available in the country therefore few agro-
dealers would have significant knowledge about their 
attributes. 
vi   For more information on other striga management practices, 
see AATF, 2006.
vii Only AGMARK certified agro-dealers have been allowed to 
trade in ImR-maize seed.
viii See also: Fred K. Kanampiu, Joel K. Ransom, Dennis Friesena, 
Jonathan Gressel, 2002: Imazapyr and pyrithiobac movement 
in soil and from maize seed coats to control Striga in legume 
intercropping.
ix  Interviews with agro dealers in Sega, Siaya County.
x  www.aatf-africa.org/striga/. STRIGA Project Brief.
xi Information Sources: 
 www.monsanto.com/monsantotoday/2009/revisiting 
wema.asp. Accessed on 17/01/2011.
 www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/WEMA-brief.pdf.  Accessed on 
17/01/2011
 www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/WEMA-FAQ. pdf Accessed on 
17/01/2011
 www.aatfnet.org/files/Bulletin/WEMA%20Bulletin%20
Sept%2009.pdf Accessed on 17/01/2011
xii Source: WEMA Project Brief, Available at http://www.aatf-
africa.org/userfiles/WEMA-brief.pdf, Accessed January 2011
xiii Information Sources: 
 www.monsanto.com/monsantotoday/2009/revisiting 
wema.asp. Accessed on 17/01/2011.
 www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/WEMA-brief.pdf.  Accessed on 
17/01/2011
 www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/WEMA-FAQ. pdf Accessed on 
17/01/2011
 www.aatfnet.org/files/Bulletin/WEMA%20Bulletin%20
Sept%2009.pdf Accessed on 17/01/2011
xiv http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Steps%204%20
Maize%20Security%20does%20not%20equal%20Food%20
security.pdf
xv http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Steps%201%20
Environmental%20Change.pdf
xvi http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53247
xvii The use of Agrobiodiversity by Indigenous and Traditional 
Agricultural Communities in Adapting to Climate Change-
Synthesis Paper-http://agrobiodiversityplatform.org/blog/
wp-content/uploads/2010/05/PAR-Synthesis_low_FINAL.
pdf
xviii www.stwr.org/.../market-led-development-aid-for-africa-
good-for-business-bad-for-farmers.html
xix  http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Steps%206%20
Living%20in%20parallel.pdf
xx www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/PartnershipsNewsletter_5-6_
Feb-July10.pdf. Accessed 17 January, 2011
xxi Source: www.foodfreedom.wordpress.com/2010/08/27/
gates-foundation-invests-in-monsanto. Accessed 18 January, 
2011
xxii www.thebioenergysite.com/news/2615/kenya-passes-
biosafety-bill-aided-by-usgc-efforts.  Accessed 18 January, 
2011
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Appendix 1: Contact details of Key 
informants
Organization Name of Key informant Position
Western Seed Company Syed Osman Bokhari Commercial Director
Kenya Seed Company Francis Ndambuki Head of operations
OTIT Farm Care – Sega Charles Odiero Chairman, Agro Dealers, Western 
Kenya
ARDAP- an NGO Boniface Omondi Striga Project Coordinator -ARDAP
Ebachamani S.H.G Salome Wesonga Chairperson, Ebachamai S.H.G
Bulala Self Help Group Philip Opicho Chairperson, Bulala S.H.G
Maseno University George Odhiambo Lecture, Maseno University
Organization Name of Key informant Position
Western Seed Company Syed Osman Bokhari Commercial Director
Kenya Seed Company Francis Ndambuki Head of operations
OTIT Farm Care – Sega Charles Odiero 
ARDAP- an NGO Boniface Omondi Striga Project Coordinator 
Bulala Self Help Group Farmer group
2FGDs  Farmer group
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